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What is Natural Resources Management (NRM)? 
What is managed is not the natural resources but the uses made of them by actors. 
Institutions are “humanly devised constraints” influencing actors’ uses of resources. 
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In short my interest is focused on how institutions influence the behavior of actors 
and, vice versa how actors influence the institutions. 
Actors choose to mobilize one or another institution. This is highly strategic ! 
Institutions: what are we talking about? 
Arrangements 
entre acteurs Partie ou non 
Concrete examples Types of institutions Types of actors 
Propriety, land tenures 
«Property Rights System» 
Public regulations 
«Public Policies» 
right-holders (owners, 
etc.) or not 
Beneficiaries or targeted 
actors 
Implementation outputs 
(permit, limitation, etc.) 
Property titles, 
easements, etc. 
i s or not 
Negotiated agreements 
« Institutional 
Arrangements» 
Agreements, private or 
admi istr tive contracts 
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Central issue in Resource Economics 
Central issue in Public Policy Analysis 
Central issue in New Institutional Economics 
Stemming from the ground 
Stemming from a collective policy process (≠ Σ of private interests) 
Stemming from a bi-/multilateral agreement (= Σ of private interests) 
My thesis tries to grasp all those institutions and their interactions 
It is a conceptual input in the “Institutional Resource Regime” analytical framework. 
(Knoepfel et al 2001, 2003, Aubin 2007, Gerber et al. 2009, etc. ) 
Application of my research on “Forests for Water” 
Forest services for ground water 
Forests provide an active protection of groundwater  through the natural filtration 
and purification processes provided by forest soil during infiltration. 
The issue of water quality and quantity depends also on the type of forestry. 
Some facts: 
In Switzerland, 47% of groundwater 
protection areas are located in the forest 
(Brändli, 2010). 
In Lombok Island, 50% of the springs dried 
up following deforestation since 1985 (BLHP, 
Provincial Service of Environment and Research). 
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Research design 
Each institutional context favors one type of institution, but never exclusively. 
I conducted 6 case studies in 3 different institutional contexts (one for each type).  
In order to control the other variables, we have drawn an embedded research design 
that allows us to compare our object in different institutional contexts. 
French Context : property rights 
Case study 1 
Observations 
 
Case study 2 
Observations 
Swiss Context: public policies  
Case study 3 
Observations 
 
Case study 4 
Observations 
Indonesian Context: arrangements  
Case study 5 
Observations 
 
Case study 6 
Observations 
Working 
Paper 1 
Working 
Paper 2 
Working 
Paper 3 PhD 
thesis 
Published Forthcoming 
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Published 
This presentation focuses on “negotiated regulation” 
Arrangements 
entre acteurs Partie ou non 
Concrete examples Types of institutions Types of actors 
Propriety, land tenures 
«Property Rights System» 
Public regulations 
«Public Policies» 
right-holders (owners, 
etc.) or not 
Beneficiaries or targeted 
actors 
Implementation outputs 
(permit, limitation, etc.) 
Property titles, 
easements, etc. 
i s or not 
Negotiated agreements 
« Institutional 
Arrangements» 
Agreements, private or 
admi istr tive contracts 
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Central issue in Resource Economics 
Central issue in Public Policy Analysis 
Central issue in New Institutional Economics 
Stemming from the ground 
Stemming from a collective policy process (≠ Σ of private interests) 
Stemming from a bi-/multilateral agreements (= Σ of private interests) 
Focus of this presentation 
Contracting as a public intervention 
Public administrations conclude contracts with various actors. 
Purchasing  (to buy s.th. necessary for public service provision) 
 e. g. Purchasing of a purification plant or buy the forest. 
Public Private Partnership (to delegate a public service provision) 
 e. g. Delegation of water purification service to a private company on a long term. 
Bilateral contract with individuals (to modify a behavior or offer a compensation) 
 e. g. Compensation of a forester, who agrees not to exploit his forest. 
Incentive used as an implementation tool (pay to reach a political goal set in a regulation) 
 e. g. European “Voluntary” Agro-Environmental Subsidies. 
Conventional easement (without expropriation for public utility) 
 e.g. Access to a water catchment or to lay a pipe on someones land. 
     … etc. many other possibilities are observed. 
The existence of a “contract” is not a relevant criteria because we observe them in 
all three types of institution. Rather the criteria is the bi-/multilateral agreement. 
The legal regime differs according to the contract (i. e. private or administrative law). 
The possibility for public administrations to conclude contracts depends very much 
of the legal tradition (i. e. Common law vs. Civil law; Germanic tradition vs. French tradition, etc.). 
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Use of negotiated arrangement to protect the environment 
The question is : 
“to what extent public payments can or cannot be assimilated to PES?” 
In fact, despite their importance in literature, few so-called PES meet the definition. 
Since the 1990s, Payments for Environmental Services (PES) have been promoted. 
(Neo)classical definition: 
A voluntary payments from the beneficiaries of environmental services to the 
providers of the environmental service. 
e. g. the water consumers pay foresters in order to maintain the forest. 
 
In the last 5 years, Ecological Economists have enlarged the definition to include 
public interventions, compulsory payments, etc. 
Simultaneously many public administrations are promoting PES in order to go 
beyond the limits of traditional environmental policies. 
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Examples of public payments 
Rather than regulating, the public 
administration negotiates in order to 
influence behaviors, obtain support for 
implementing a public service, etc. 
Requirement of a legal basis. 
Possibilities and limits defined by 
administrative law (e. g. not obvious in 
Switzerland and Indonesia, but common in France). 
It is a PES 
e. g. Agreement with foresters on 
logging limitation in a catchment area. 
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Implementation of provisions defined by 
a legislative body (politics) in a regulation. 
It is an output of a public policy, that 
privileges incentive over constraint.  
The provider is a candidate to whom the 
administration decides to allocate funds. 
Legally there is no bi-/multilateral 
agreement, but a unilateral decision. 
It is not a PES. 
e. g. Public subsidies for catchment 
protection in a forest area. 
We observe many confusions between those two types of public payments. 
Not every public payment corresponds to the PES concept. 
  
Negotiated arrangement Incentive policy implementation 
PES on my field research 
Lombok island (Indonesia) 
4 kabupaten + 1 kota 
Nusa Tenggara Barat prov., 
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Catchment area 
Urban area 
Activities in the field 
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“PES” implementation in West Lombok Regency 
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X 
2007 - The local parliament enacts an 
incentive policy (regional regulation, 
perda 4/2007). 
The previous independent 
intermediary body is replaced 
by a public body. 
The stake is control over money! 
2004-07 – NGOs and PWS try to set a 
PES with the support of donors. 
“Deforestation in recharging area” 
defined as a public problem. 
Creation of bodies (providers in 
upland, intermediary and water 
consumers association). 
First payments (few). 1 
Those different types of implementation are often mixed up! 
They are interdependent (i. e. indirect effects: no 2 without 1, etc.) 
1 = private-private PES 
2 = incentive policy ≠ PES 3 = public-private PES 
2010 - beginning of the activities 
(payments to farmer groups 
presenting a request and a project). 
2011 – continuation… 
2012 – continuation… 
2 
2013 – continuation… 
3 
The Public Water Supply 
(PWS) Company create its 
own PES, financed by its own 
budget, based on water laws. 
The incentive policy is considered 
as not effective enough. 
2012-first 
implementation. 
2013 -  
continuation… 
Synthesis: which institutions are implemented now in Lombok? 
Arrangements 
entre acteurs Partie ou non 
Concrete examples Types of institutions Types of actors 
Propriety, land tenures 
«Property Rights System» 
Public regulations 
«Public Policies» 
right-holders (owners, 
etc.) or not 
Beneficiaries or targeted 
actors 
Implementation outputs 
(permit, limitation, etc.) 
Property titles, 
easements, etc. 
i s or not 
Negotiated agreements 
« Institutional 
Arrangements» 
Agreements, private or 
admi istr tive contracts 
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Even in a weak institutional context, all 3 types of institutions are implemented. 
To understand the reality, it is not possible to focus only on one type. 
Land owners hav  been xpropriated 
from the catchmen  area. 
Incentive policy encouraging local 
actors to reforest (perda 4/2007). 
The public water sup ly company pay 
locals for reforestati  activities. 
Conclusion 
It is not important to know if a payment scheme is a “PES” or not, but… 
it is essential to differentiate between the different types of institutions in order to 
use an appropriate analytical framework. 
In this respect, the confusion between PES and incentive policies is problematic. 
• Rational choice theories are dismissed to understand policy process which driven by         
non-rational political games and power struggle issues! 
• Public Policy Analysis is not appropriate to explain negotiated arrangements! 
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The recent enlargement of the definition of PES by Ecological Economists generates 
a confusion between institutions. 
The “Institutional Resource Regime” framework is designed to grasp two types of 
institutions and explain their articulations. The integration of the third type 
(negotiated arrangement) in the IRR is not conclusive (but progressing). 
At that point, we see an urgent need for more interdisciplinary approaches! 
Thank you for your attention 
More on this topic on my Internet page: 
  www.idheap.ch/e/GuillaumedeBuren  (or Google my name) 
On the same issue:  
Schweizer, Dupuis & de Buren Guillaume (2013). “Innovative implementation by non-state 
actors in environment-related areas”. ICPP-Grenoble 
Contact:  Guillaume.deBuren@unil.ch 
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